Interbike 2009 – New SRAM Wireless Power Meter Cranksets

first_imgINTERBIKE 2009 – SRAM introduced two new Wireless power meter cranksets at Interbike, one geared for normal road riding and one single big ring for time trial bikes.Both are built around Red-level crank arms and rings, but the spider is replaced with the power measurement device. Depending on the model, you’ll get either a Quarq or SRM spider, but both work on the ANT+ system and will work with a variety of receivers and computers.Hit ‘more’ for additional photos and specs…While SRAM showed a prototype of this at Sea Otter, they waited to introduce it until the units could meet European CEN standardsThe double road ring uses an SRM power meter spider built with SRAM’s standard 53/39 Red rings, but you can interchange with any of SRAM’s road rings.The crank arms on both are UD (uni-directional) carbon fiber, and both models will be available in four arm lengths ranging from 170mm to 177.5mm. They’ll be available in BB30 or standard GXP bottom bracket varieties.The TT version comes with Quarq’s power meter spider and a nearly solid big ring for puttin’ the hammer down.Both versions should work with Garmin’s new ANT+ computers, too. They’ll be available in October, and they’ve been raced under Astana, Milram, Michellie Jones and Norman Stadtler during development.OTHER NEW SRAM STUFF FROM INTERBIKE:LINK: SRAM Singlespeed Road Bike Brake LeversLINK: SRAM Aluminum Road Bike WheelsLINK: Avid Shorty Ultimate Cyclocross Brakeslast_img read more

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Rule clarifies duty if your client is lying

first_imgDPC also takes up failure to respond to a grievance and direct mail solicitation issues Senior EditorUnder proposed rule amendments being sent to the Supreme Court, lawyers must tell the court if they know a client has lied or provided false information to a court, Bar members could face contempt if they fail to respond to a Bar grievance inquiry, and Bar members may not send direct mail solicitations to respondents of domestic violence restraining orders until after the orders have been served.Those were among several Bar rule and Standing Board Policy amendments presented by the Disciplinary Procedure Committee Chair Andy Sasso and approved by the Bar Board of Governors at its May 30 meeting.On rule 4-3.3, the amendment clarifies in the comment section that a lawyer must attempt to get a client who has provided false information to the court to correct that information. It also provides that, “In any case, the advocate should ensure disclosure is made to the court,” according to the amendment. The amendment also clarifies that while a lawyer must refuse to offer testimony he or she knows is false, the lawyer can also refuse to offer testimony or evidence that he or she reasonably believes is untrue.Sasso added that the amendment specifies that a lawyer is not precluded from offering evidence if he or she only has a reasonable belief it is false.Proposed changes Rules 3-7.11 and 4-8.4 create a new summary procedure for cases where a Bar member fails to respond to a Bar grievance inquiry. Currently, a failure to respond must be processed through the grievance committee, referee, and appellate process if necessary. The new system would allow the Bar to petition the Supreme Court for a contempt and show cause order, allows assignment of such cases to referees for factual findings, and authorizes suspensions in cases where attorneys fail to respond.The proposed new Rule 4-7.4(b)(1)(G) stemmed from a recommendation from the Citizen’s Forum that was endorsed by the Standing Committee on Advertising. It came from a case where an individual sought a domestic violence restraining order. A lawyer obtained the respondent’s name from public court records and mailed a solicitation — which arrived before the restraining order was served, before the respondent knew of its existence, and while the person obtaining the order and the respondent were still sharing a home.Rule 4-7.4(b)(1) provides a list of instances where a direct mail solicitation may not be made, and adds a new subsection to that list. It provides that a solicitation may not be mailed to the injunction respondent “if the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the respondent named in the injunction petition has not yet been served with notice of process in the matter.”One issue that drew board discussion involved amendments to Rules 3-7.2(m) and 3-3.2, which deal with Bar grievance cases involving judges who have been removed from the bench for misconduct that might also violate Bar rules.The amendments would streamline the Bar case by providing that factual findings in the Supreme Court order removing the judge would be accepted as conclusive proof of those facts in the Bar grievance. The rules also streamline notice and filing procedures for the Bar.Board members David Rothman and Larry Sellers said the rule commits the Bar to accept as facts something determined by the Judicial Qualifications Commission.“We’re bound by the presentation of someone else and we may do a better job or a different job,” Rothman said. “What if there is more proof out there to show the other side of the coin and that was not presented [to the JQC]?”But Sasso said the rule is limited to cases where the Supreme Court issues an order, with factual findings, in cases where a judge is removed from office. He added that in JQC cases where a judge receives a lesser discipline than removal from office, the Bar cannot proceed with a grievance because it has no jurisdiction over sitting judges.The board approved the proposed amendments by voice vote, with several dissents.Other amendments approved included:• A new Rule 3-5.4 to codify Bar policies on publication of Bar disciplinary actions, which came about from a request from the Supreme Court. It provides, in accordance with current practices, that all disciplinary sanctions, including admonishments, must be disclosed upon inquiry. The rule follows current policy of listing a member’s 10-year history of admonishments, reprimands, suspensions, probations, and disbarments.• A new Rule 3-7.17, which allows the Bar to petition the Supreme Court, or the court on its own motion, to prohibit vexatious conduct or limit the activities of those engaged in such conduct. The rule provides that, “Vexatious conduct is conduct that amounts to abuse of the Bar disciplinary process by use of inappropriate, repetitive, or frivolous actions or communications of any kind” that are aimed at participants in a grievance proceeding, the Bar, or the court.• An amendment to Rule 4-7.10(c) clarifying the definition of lawyer referral services.• An amendment to Rule 5-1.1(g) revising the definition of IOTA trust funds to conform with recent rulings. The change provides that funds in an IOTA trust account must be those that the lawyer has determined “cannot earn income for the client or third person in excess of the costs to secure the income.”• A new Standing Board Policy 15.77, which gives guidance to Board of Governors members when they act as designated reviewers in grievance cases.• An amendment to Rule 4-7.5, which deletes the requirement that a nonlawyer spokesperson in an electronic ad must be identified as a nonlawyer. The change would address a problem where lawyers placing public service sponsorships on National Public Radio stations must, under NPR policies, have the ads read by station personnel which in turn appears to violate Bar rules. With the proposed change, if there is any doubt about whether a nonlawyer spokesperson is a lawyer, then he or she would have to be identified as a nonlawyer under other Bar rules, which require that ads not be misleading.• Adding subsection (p) to Rule 3-2.1, which provides that the Bar president with board approval will select a designated reviewer for a special grievance committee.The board tabled a proposed Standing Board Policy that the Bar will not record a public reprimand administered at a board meeting except with the authorization of the Bar president, and will not post any such recording on its Web site. Some board members asked why there was an exception to the policy, and Sasso explained that a reprimand might be recorded for use at a CLE or training session. He said the policy not to post any recording on the Web site was because that could make the impact of a public reprimand more severe than a more serious disciplinary case that resulted in a suspension. Board members said they would like clearer language on the issue and decided to postpone it for another meeting. Sasso noted the policy will only apply to the Bar, which cannot prohibit the public or news media from attending a board meeting and recording or broadcasting a public reprimand. Rule clarifies duty if your client is lying Rule clarifies duty if your client is lyingcenter_img July 1, 2008 Gary Blankenship Senior Editor Regular Newslast_img read more

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Bar recommends 78 for JNC appointments

first_img Bar recommends 78 for JNC appointments The Bar Board of Governors has nominated 78 attorneys to fill upcoming vacancies on each of the state’s 26 judicial nominating commissions and forwarded the list to Gov. Rick Scott.The board, at its May meeting, picked a slate of three attorneys for each JNC and Scott will appoint one to each JNC for four-year terms beginning July 1.The JNCs review applicants for all vacancies on the Supreme Court and the district courts of appeal, and for mid-term vacancies on the trial courts within their respective circuits. Currently, the governor directly appoints five members of each JNC and chooses the other four members from slates nominated by the Bar.Here are the attorneys nominated for the various JNCs: • For the Supreme Court JNC, Cynthia A. Everett of Miami, Sheila M. McDevitt of St. Petersburg, and Israel Umberto Reyes of Miami. • For the First District Court of Appeal JNC, Michael J. Glazer of Tallahassee, Michael J. Korn of Jacksonville, and George T. Reeves of Madison. • For the Second DCA JNC, Thomas H. Dart of Sarasota, Henry C. Gyden of St. Petersburg, and Celene H. Humphries of Riverview. • For the Third DCA JNC, Timothy J. Koenig of Key West, Elliot H. Scherker of Miami, and Gilbert K. Squires of Miami Beach. • For the Fourth DCA JNC, Debra A. Jenks of Palm Beach Gardens, Shelley H. Leinicke of Ft. Lauderdale, and Gerald F. Richman of Palm Beach Gardens. • For the Fifth DCA JNC, R. Lee Bennett of Orlando, David A. Paul of Orlando, and Michael C. Sasso of Oviedo. • For the First Circuit JNC, Nathan C. Bess of Pensacola, Lennard B. Register III of Pace, and William R. Wade of Pensacola. • For the Second Circuit JNC, Elizabeth L. Bevington of Lamont, Robert N. Clark, Jr., of Tallahassee, and Kimberly A. Driggers of Tallahassee. • For the Third Circuit JNC, Conrad C. Bishop, Jr., of Perry, Marlin M. Feagle of Lake City, and Jerry D. Marsee of Lake City. • For the Fourth Circuit JNC, Courtney K. Grimm of Green Cove Springs, Robert E. O’Quinn, Jr., of Jacksonville, and Cherry Alice Shaw of Jacksonville. • For the Fifth Circuit JNC, Gordon J. Glover of Ocala, James T. Schatt of Ocala, and Janet R. Varnell of Summerfield. • For the Sixth Circuit JNC, Donald S. Crowell of Largo, Kimberly J. Gustafson of St. Pete Beach, and Scott F. Schiltz of Clearwater. • For the Seventh Circuit JNC, Steven N. Gosney of Ormond Beach, Katherine H. Miller of Daytona Beach, and Theodore W. Small, Jr., of DeLand. • For the Eighth Circuit JNC, Paul A. Donnelly of Gainesville, Richard M. Knellinger of Evinston, and Shannon M. Miller of Gainesville. • For the Ninth Circuit JNC, Elizabeth F. McCausland of Orlando, William C. Vose of Orlando, and Thomas A. Zehnder of Orlando. • For the 10th Circuit JNC, James Russell Franklin of Lakeland, Matthew E. Kaylor of Winter Haven, and Richard E. Straughn of Winter Haven. • For the 11th Circuit JNC, Melanie E. Damian of Miami Beach, Corali Lopez-Castro of Coral Gables, and Jeffrey Rynor of Miami Beach. • For the 12th Circuit JNC, Bonnie Lee A. Polk of Sarasota, Marjorie A. Schmoyer of Sarasota, and Varinia Van Ness of Sarasota. • For the 13th Circuit JNC, Alexander Caballero of Tampa, Kamilah L. Perry of Tampa, and Amanda A. Sansone of Tampa. • For the 14th Circuit JNC, Todd Clifford Brister of Panama City, Clifford Carlton Higby of Panama City, and William A. Lewis of Panama City. • For the 15th Circuit JNC, Richard M. Benrubi of Boca Raton, Sarah Cortvriend of North Palm Beach, and Anna Morales-Christiansen of Lake Worth. • For the 16th Circuit JNC, Natileene Cassel of Ramrod Key, Christine Limbert-Barrows of Little Torch Key, and Robert B. Schillinger of Key West. • For the 17th Circuit JNC, Terrence P. O’Connor of Lighthouse Point, Ian S. Seitel of Ft. Lauderdale, and Linda S. White of Ft. Lauderdale. • For the 18th Circuit JNC, Erin L. Greene of Longwood, Steven D. Kramer of Altamonte Springs, and Mark S. Peters of Rockledge. • For the 19th Circuit JNC, Alan Orantes Forst of Palm City, Robert J. Gorman of Ft. Pierce, and Harold G. Melville of Ft. Pierce. • For the 20th Circuit JNC, Kathleen M. Fitzgeorge of Ft. Myers, Jeffrey D. Fridkin of Naples, and Alison C. Hussey of Ft. Myers. Bar recommends 78 for JNC appointmentscenter_img June 15, 2012 Regular Newslast_img read more

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Proposed criminal jury instructions

first_img Definition. Fla. Stat. 776.06(1). “Deadly force” means force likely to cause death or great bodily harm. Give if applicable. § 782.02, Fla. Stat. The use of deadly force is justifiable only if the defendant reasonably believe s d that the force is was necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to [himself] [herself] while resisting an attempt to commit (applicable felony) upon [him] [her] or in any dwelling in which [he][she] was present. 1. (Defendant) was attempting to commit, committing, or escaping after the commission of (applicable forcible felony) ; or Insert and Define applicable forcible felony that defendant alleges victim was about to commit , but omit any reference to burden of proof. See Montijo v. State, 61 So. 3d 424 (Fla. 5 th DCA 2011) . Forcible felonies are listed in § 776.08, Fla. Stat. Aggressor. § 776.041, Fla. Stat. However, the use of deadly force is not justifiable if you find: Give only if there is evidence that the defendant is charged with was committing an independent forcible felony. See Giles v. State, 831 So. 2d 1263 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002). 1. another’s attempt to murder [him] [her], or 2. any attempt to commit (applicable felony) upon [him] [her], or 3. any attempt to commit (applicable felony) upon or in any dwelling, residence, or vehicle occupied by [him] [her]. 1. imminent death or great bodily harm to [himself] [herself] or another, or 2. the imminent commission of (applicable forcible felony) [ against [himself] [herself] [ or another ] . ] a. It is a defense to the crime with which (defendant) is charged if the [death of] [injury to] (victim) resulted from the justifiable use of deadly force. Insert and Define applicable felony that defendant alleges victim attempted to commit , but omit any reference to burden of proof. See Montijo v. State, 61 So.3d 424 (Fla. 5 th DCA 2011) . Give if applicable. §§ 776.012, 776.031, Fla. Stat. A person is justified in using deadly force if [he] [she] reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent Force in resisting a law enforcement officer. § 776.051(1), Fla. Stat. A person is not justified in using force to resist an arrest by a law enforcement officer, or to resist a law enforcement officer who is engaged in the execution of a legal duty, if the law enforcement officer was acting in good faith and he or she is known, or reasonably appears, to be a law enforcement officer. Give the following instruction if applicable. However, if an officer uses excessive force to make an arrest, then a person is justified in the use of reasonable force to defend [himself] [herself] [another], but only to the extent [he] [she] reasonably believes such force is necessary. See § 776.012, Fla. Stat.; Ivester v. State, 398 So. 2d 926 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); Jackson v. State, 463 So. 2d 372 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985). In some instances, the instructions applicable to §§ 776.012, 776.031, or 776.041, Fla. Stat., may need to be given in connection with this instruction. Read in all cases. In deciding whether the defendant was justified in the use of non-deadly force, you must judge [him] [her] by the circumstances by which [he] [she] was surrounded at the time the force was used. The danger facing the defendant need not have been actual; however, to justify the use of non-deadly force, the appearance of danger must have been so real that a reasonably cautious and prudent person under the same circumstances would have believed that the danger could be avoided only through the use of that force. Based upon appearances, the defendant must have actually believed that the danger was real. Reputation of victim known by defendant . Give if applicable. If you find that (victim) had a reputation of being a violent and dangerous person and that [his] [her] reputation was known to the defendant, you may consider this fact in determining whether the actions of the defendant were those of a reasonable person in dealing with an individual of that reputation. Reputation of victim not necessarily known by defendant (to show victim acted in conformity with victim’s character). Give if applicable. If you find that (victim) had a reputation of being a violent and dangerous person, you may consider this fact in determining whether [he] [she] was the initial aggressor. Physical abilities. Read in all cases. In considering the issue of self-defense, you may take into account the relative physical abilities and capacities of the defendant and (victim) . Read in all cases. If, in your consideration of the issue of self-defense you have a reasonable doubt on the question of whether the defendant was justified in the use of non-deadly force, you should find the defendant not guilty. However, if from the evidence you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not justified in the use of non-deadly force, then you should find [him] [her] guilty if all the elements of the charge have been proved. Comment b. It is a defense to the crime of (name of crime charged that did not result in injury or death) if the actions of the defendant constituted the justifiable use of deadly force. IN RE: STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES—REPORT NO. 2012-03, CASE NO. SC12-1363 3.6(f) JUSTIFIABLE USE OF DEADLY FORCE Because there are many defenses applicable to self-defense, give only those parts of the instructions that are required by the evidence. Unless the evidence establishes the force used was deadly or non-deadly as a matter of law, both 3.6(f) and 3.6(g) must be given. Mathis v. State, 863 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 1 st DCA 2004). Read in all cases. An issue in this case is whether the defendant acted in self-defense. It is a defense to the offense with which (defendant) is charged if the [death of] [injury to] (victim) resulted from the justifiable use of deadly force. Give a or b as applicable. The Supreme Court Committee on Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases (committee) has submitted to the Florida Supreme Court a report proposing revisions to Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases 3.6(f) – Justifiable Use of Deadly Force; and 3.6(g) – Justifiable Use of Non-deadly Force. The Court invites all interested persons to comment on the committee’s proposed amendments, which are reproduced in full below, as well as online at http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/decisions/proposed.shtml. An original and nine paper copies of all comments must be filed with the Court on or before October 15, 2012, with a certificate of service verifying that a copy has been served on the committee chair, The Honorable Jacqueline Hogan Scola, 73 W. Flagler Street, Room 414, Miami, Florida 33130, c/o Bart Schneider, Office of the General Counsel, 500 S. Duval Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925, as well as a separate request for oral argument if the person filing the comment wishes to participate in oral argument, which may be scheduled in this case. The committee chair has until November 5, 2012, to file a response to any comments filed with the Court. Electronic copies of all comments also must be filed in accordance with the Court’s administrative order In re Mandatory Submission of Electronic Copies of Documents, Fla. Admin. Order No. AOSC04-84 (Sept. 13, 2004). IN THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA a. the person against whom the defensive force is used has the right to be in [or is a lawful resident of the [dwelling] [residence]] [the vehicle], such as an owner, lessee, or titleholder, and there is not an injunction for protection from domestic violence or a written pretrial supervision order of no contact against that person; or b. the person or persons sought to be removed is a child or grandchild, or is otherwise in the lawful custody or under the lawful guardianship of, the person against whom the defensive force is used; or c. the person who uses defensive force is engaged in an unlawful activity or is using the [dwelling] [residence] [occupied vehicle] to further an unlawful activity; ord. the person against whom the defensive force is used is a law enforcement officer, who enters or attempts to enter a [dwelling] [residence] [vehicle] in the performance of [his] [her] official duties and the officer identified [himself] [herself] in accordance with any applicable law or the person using the force knew or reasonably should have known that the person entering or attempting to enter was a law enforcement officer. 3. (Defendant) must have reasonably believed that [his] [her] use of force was necessary to prevent or terminate (victim’s) wrongful behavior. No duty to retreat (dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle). Give if applicable. If the defendant is in [his] [her] [dwelling] [residence] [occupied vehicle] [he] [she] is presumed to have held a reasonable fear of imminent peril of death or bodily injury to [himself] [herself] [another] if (victim) has [unlawfully and forcibly entered] [has removed or attempted to remove another person against that person’s will from] that [dwelling] [residence] [occupied vehicle] and the defendant had reason to believe that had occurred. The defendant had no duty to retreat under such circumstances. Presumption of fear (unlawful and forcible entry into dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle). Give if applicable. § 776.013(1), Fla. Stat. The defendant is presumed to have held a reasonable fear of imminent peril of death or great bodily harm to [himself] [herself] [another] when using defensive force if: a. The person against whom the defensive force was used was in the process of unlawfully and forcefully entering, or had unlawfully and forcibly entered, a dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle, or if that person had removed or was attempting to remove another against that person’s will from the dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle; and b. The defendant knew or had reason to believe that an unlawful and forcible entry or unlawful and forcible act was occurring or had occurred. Exceptions to Presumption of Fear. § 776.013(2)(a)-(d), Fla. Stat. Give as applicable. The presumption of reasonable fear of imminent death or great bodily harm does not apply if: a. the person against whom the defensive force is used has the right to be in [or is a lawful resident of the [dwelling] [residence]] [the vehicle], such as an owner, lessee, or titleholder, and there is not an injunction for protection from domestic violence or a written pretrial supervision order of no contact against that person; or b. the person or persons sought to be removed is a child or grandchild, or is otherwise in the lawful custody or under the lawful guardianship of, the person against whom the defensive force is used; or c. the person who uses defensive force is engaged in an unlawful activity or is using the [dwelling] [residence] [occupied vehicle] to further an unlawful activity; or d. the person against whom the defensive force is used is a law enforcement officer, who enters or attempts to enter a [dwelling] [residence] [vehicle] in the performance of [his] [her] official duties and the officer identified [himself] [herself] in accordance with any applicable law or the person using the force knew or reasonably should have known that the person entering or attempting to enter was a law enforcement officer. If requested, give definition of “law enforcement officer” from §943.10(14), Fla. Stat. § 776.013(4), Fla. Stat. Give if applicable. A person who unlawfully and by force enters or attempts to enter another’s [dwelling] [residence] [occupied vehicle] is presumed to be doing so with the intent to commit an unlawful act involving force or violence. Definitions. Give if applicable. § 776.013(5), Fla. Stat. As used with regard to self defense, “Dwelling” means a building or conveyance of any kind, including any attached porch, whether the building or conveyance is temporary or permanent or mobile or immobile, which has a roof over it, including a tent, and is designed to be occupied by people lodging therein at night. “Residence” means a dwelling in which a person resides either temporarily or permanently or is visiting as an invited guest. “Vehicle” means a conveyance of any kind, whether or not motorized, which is designed to transport people or property. No duty to retreat (location other than dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle). Give if applicable. See Novak v. State 974 So. 2d 520 (Fla. 4 th DCA 2008) regarding unlawful activity. There is no duty to retreat where the defendant was not engaged in any unlawful activity other than the crime(s) for which the defendant asserts the justification. If the defendant [ was not engaged in an unlawful activity and ] was attacked in any place where [he] [she] had a right to be, [he] [she] had no duty to retreat and had the right to stand [his] [her] ground and meet force with force, including deadly force, if [he] [she] reasonably believed that it was necessary to do so to prevent death or great bodily harm to [himself] [herself] [another] or to prevent the commission of a forcible felony. Definitions. As used with regard to self defense, “Dwelling” means a building or conveyance of any kind, including any attached porch, whether the building or conveyance is temporary or permanent or mobile or immobile, which has a roof over it, including a tent, and is designed to be occupied by people lodging therein at night. “Residence” means a dwelling in which a person resides either temporarily or permanently or is visiting as an invited guest. “Vehicle” means a conveyance of any kind, whether or not motorized, which is designed to transport people or property. Define applicable forcible felony that defendant alleges victim was about to commit , but omit any reference to burden of proof. See Montijo v. State, 61 So. 3d 424 (Fla. 5 th DCA 2011) . Give in all cases. § 776.013(3), Fla. Stat. A person does not have a duty to retreat if the person is not engaged in an unlawful activity and is in a place where [he] [she] has a right to be. Duty to retreat when defendant was engaged in unlawful activity. Give if applicable. See Dorsey v. State, 74 So.3d 521 (Fla. 4 th DCA 2011). If the defendant was engaged in an unlawful activity, or if [he] [she] was attacked in a place where [he] [she] did not have a right to be, then the fact that the defendant was wrongfully attacked cannot justify [his] [her] use of force if, by retreating, [he] [she] could have avoided the need to use that force. However, if the defendant was wrongfully attacked or was wrongfully placed in a position of imminent danger of another’s use of unlawful force, and it would have increased [his] [her] own danger to retreat, then the defendant did not have a duty to retreat and [his] [her] use of non-deadly force was justifiable if [he] [she] reasonably believed that such force was necessary to prevent the use of unlawful force against [himself] [herself] or another. Aggressor. § 776.041, Fla. Stat. The use of non-deadly force is not justified if you find: Give only if there is evidence that the defendant is charged with was committing an independent forcible felony. See Giles v. State, 831 So. 2d 1263 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002). 1. (Defendant) was attempting to commit, committing, or escaping after the commission of a (applicable forcible felony). Define applicable forcible felony. 2. (Defendant) initially provoked the use of force against [himself] [herself], unless: a. The force asserted toward the defendant was so great that [he] [she] reasonably believed that [he] [she] was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and had exhausted every reasonable means to escape the danger, other than using non-deadly force on (assailant) . b. In good faith, the defendant withdrew from physical contact with ( assailant ) and indicated clearly to (assailant) that [he] [she] wanted to withdraw and stop the use of non-deadly force, but (assailant) continued or resumed the use of force. center_img Define applicable forcible felony. Define after paragraph 2 if both paragraphs 1 and 2 are given. Forcible felonies are listed in § 776.08, Fla. Stat. b. It is a defense to the crime of (name of crime charged that did not result in injury or death) if the actions of the defendant constituted the justifiable use of non-deadly force. Definition. “Non-deadly” force means force not likely to cause death or great bodily harm. In defense of person. § 776.012, Fla. Stat. Give if applicable. (Defendant) would be justified in using non-deadly force against (victim) if the following two facts are proved : 1. (Defendant) must have reasonably believed that such conduct was necessary to defend [himself] [herself] [another] against (victim’s) imminent use of unlawful force against the [defendant] [another person] . ; and 2. The use of unlawful force by (victim) must have appeared to (defendant) to be ready to take place. In defense of property. § 776.031, Fla. Stat. Give if applicable. (Defendant) would be justified in using non-deadly force against (victim) if the following three facts are proved : 1. (Victim) must have been was about to trespass or was trespassing or otherwise wrongfully interfering with land or personal property ; and . 2. The land or personal property must have was lawfully been in (defendant’s) possession, or in the possession of a member of [his] [her] immediate family or household, or in the possession of some person whose property [he] [she] was under a legal duty to protect ; and . September 15, 2012 Regular News Proposed criminal jury instructions If requested, give definition of “law enforcement officer” from § 943.10(14), Fla. Stat. , § 776.013(4), Fla. Stat. Give if as applicable. A person who unlawfully and by force enters or attempts to enter another’s [dwelling] [residence] [occupied vehicle] is presumed to be doing so with the intent to commit an unlawful act involving force or violence. Definitions. Give if applicable. § 776.013(5), Fla. Stat. As used with regard to self defense: “Dwelling” means a building or conveyance of any kind, including any attached porch, whether the building or conveyance is temporary or permanent or mobile or immobile, which has a roof over it, including a tent, and is designed to be occupied by people lodging therein at night. “Residence” means a dwelling in which a person resides either temporarily or permanently or is visiting as an invited guest. “Vehicle” means a conveyance of any kind, whether or not motorized, which is designed to transport people or property . Prior threats. Give if applicable. If you find that the defendant who because of threats or prior difficulties with (victim) had reasonable grounds to believe that [he] [she] was in danger of death or great bodily harm at the hands of (victim), then the defendant had the right to arm [himself] [herself]. However, the defendant cannot justify the use of deadly force, if after arming [himself] [herself] [he] [she] renewed [his] [her] difficulty with (victim) when [he] [she] could have avoided the difficulty, although as previously explained if the defendant was not engaged in an unlawful activity and was attacked in any place where [he] [she] had a right to be, [he] [she] had no duty to retreat. Reputation of victim known by defendant . Give if applicable. If you find that (victim) had a reputation of being a violent and dangerous person and that [his] [her] reputation was known to the defendant, you may consider this fact in determining whether the actions of the defendant were those of a reasonable person in dealing with an individual of that reputation. Reputation of victim not necessarily known by defendant (to show victim acted in conformity with victim’s character). Give if applicable. If you find that (victim) had a reputation of being a violent and dangerous person, you may consider this fact in determining whether [he] [she] was the initial aggressor. Physical abilities. Read in all cases. In considering the issue of self-defense, you may take into account the relative physical abilities and capacities of the defendant and (victim). Read in all cases. If in your consideration of the issue of self-defense you have a reasonable doubt on the question of whether the defendant was justified in the use of deadly force, you should find the defendant not guilty. However, if from the evidence you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not justified in the use of deadly force, you should find [him] [her] guilty if all the elements of the charge have been proved. Comment Proposed criminal jury instructions a. It is a defense to the crime with which ( defendant) is charged if the [death of] [injury to] (victim) resulted from the justifiable use of non-deadly force. 2. (Defendant) initially provoked the use of force against [himself] [herself], unless: a. The force asserted toward the defendant was so great that [he] [she] reasonably believed that [he] [she] was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and had exhausted every reasonable means to escape the danger, other than using deadly force on (assailant) .b. In good faith, the defendant withdrew from physical contact with ( assailant ) and clearly indicated to (assailant) that [he] [she] wanted to withdraw and stop the use of deadly force, but (assailant) continued or resumed the use of force. Force in resisting a law enforcement officer. § 776.051(1), Fla. Stat. A person is not justified in using force to resist an arrest by a law enforcement officer, or to resist a law enforcement officer who is engaged in the execution of a legal duty, if the law enforcement officer was acting in good faith and he or she is known, or reasonably appears, to be a law enforcement officer. Give if applicable. However, if an officer uses excessive force to make an arrest, then a person is justified in the use of reasonable force to defend [himself] [herself] (or another) , but only to the extent [he] [she] reasonably believes such force is necessary. See § 776.012, Fla. Stat.; Ivester v. State, 398 So. 2d 926 (Fla. 1 st DCA 1981); Jackson v. State, 463 So. 2d 372 (Fla. 5 th DCA 1985). In some instances, the instructions applicable to §§ 776.012, 776.031, or 776.041, Fla. Stat., may need to be given in connection with this instruction. Read in all cases. In deciding whether defendant was justified in the use of deadly force, you must judge [him] [her] by the circumstances by which [he] [she] was surrounded at the time the force was used. The danger facing the defendant need not have been actual; however, to justify the use of deadly force, the appearance of danger must have been so real that a reasonably cautious and prudent person under the same circumstances would have believed that the danger could be avoided only through the use of that force. Based upon appearances, the defendant must have actually believed that the danger was real. No duty to retreat. § 776.013(3), Fla. Stat. See Novak v. State 974 So. 2d 520 (Fla. 4 th DCA 2008) regarding unlawful activity. There is no duty to retreat where the defendant was not engaged in any unlawful activity other than the crime(s) for which the defendant asserts the justification. If the defendant [ was not engaged in an unlawful activity and ] was attacked in any place where [he] [she] had a right to be, [he] [she] had no duty to retreat and had the right to stand [his] [her] ground and meet force with force, including deadly force, if [he] [she] reasonably believed that it was necessary to do so to prevent death or great bodily harm to [himself] [herself] [another] or to prevent the commission of a forcible felony. Define applicable forcible felony from list in § 776.08, Fla. Stat. that defendant alleges victim was about to commit , but omit any reference to burden of proof. See Montijo v. State, 61 So. 3d 424 (Fla. 5 th DCA 2011) . Presumption of Fear (dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle). Give if applicable. § 776.013, Fla. Stat. If the defendant was in a(n)[dwelling] [residence] [occupied vehicle] where [he] [she] had a right to be, [he] [she] is presumed to have had a reasonable fear of imminent death or great bodily harm to [himself] [herself] [another] if (victim) had [unlawfully and forcibly entered] [removed or attempted to remove another person against that person’s will from] that [dwelling] [residence] [occupied vehicle] and the defendant had reason to believe that had occurred. The defendant had no duty to retreat under such circumstances. Duty to retreat when defendant was engaged in unlawful activity. Give if applicable. See Dorsey v. State, 74 So.3d 521 (4 th DCA 2011). If the defendant was engaged in an unlawful activity, or if [he] [she] was attacked in a place where [he] [she] did not have a right to be, then the fact that the defendant was wrongfully attacked cannot justify [his] [her] use of force likely to cause death or great bodily harm if, by retreating, [he] [she] could have avoided the need to use that force. However, if the defendant was wrongfully attacked or was wrongfully placed in a position of imminent danger of death or great bodily harm, and it would have increased [his] [her] own danger to retreat, then the defendant did not have a duty to retreat and [his] [her] use of force likely to cause death or great bodily harm was justifiable if [he] [she] reasonably believed that such force was necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to [himself] [herself] [or another]. Presumption of fear (unlawful and forcible entry into dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle). Give if applicable. § 776.013(1), Fla. Stat. The defendant is presumed to have held a reasonable fear of imminent peril of death or great bodily harm to [himself] [herself] [another] when using defensive force that was intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm to another if: a. The person against whom the defensive force was used was in the process of unlawfully and forcefully entering, or had unlawfully and forcibly entered, a dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle, or if that person had removed or was attempting to remove another against that person’s will from the dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle; and b. The defendant knew or had reason to believe that an unlawful and forcible entry or unlawful and forcible act was occurring or had occurred. Exceptions to Presumption of Fear. § 776.013(2)(a)-(d), Fla. Stat. Give as applicable. The presumption of reasonable fear of imminent death or great bodily harm does not apply if: This instruction was adopted in 1981 and was amended in 1985 [477 So. 2d 985], 1992 [603 So. 2d 1175], 2006 [930 So. 2d 612], 2008 [976 So. 2d 1081], and 2010 [27 So. 3d 640], and 2012. This instruction was adopted in 1981 and was amended in 1985 [477 So. 2d 985], 1999 [732 So. 2d 1044], 2000 [789 So. 2d 9 8 5 4], 2006 [930 So. 2d 612], 2008 [976 So. 2d 1081], and 2010 [27 So. 3d 640], and 2012. 3.6(g) JUSTIFIABLE USE OF NON-DEADLY FORCE Because there are many defenses applicable to self-defense, give only those parts of the instructions that are required by the evidence. Unless the evidence establishes that the force used was deadly or non-deadly as a matter of law, both 3.6(f) and 3.6(g) must be given. Mathis v. State, 863 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 1 st DCA 2004). Read in all cases. An issue in this case is whether the defendant acted in self-defense. It is a defense to the offense with which (defendant) is charged if the [death of] [injury to] (victim) resulted from the justifiable use of non-deadly force. Give a or b as applicable. last_img read more

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Minnesota honors pair in hometown

first_imgMinnesota honors pair in hometownThe former Hopkins teammates are now seniors at Minnesota, and both are crucial to team success. Nick GerhardtAugust 15, 2007Jump to CommentsShare on FacebookShare on TwitterShare via EmailPrintSenior Minnesota women’s basketball players Jordan Barnes and Leslie Knight took separate paths after graduating from Hopkins High School.Gophers coach Pam Borton swiped Knight up right out of high school and brought her into the program, which she’d brought to the NCAA Final Four just one season prior. Barnes headed to South Carolina to play for Winthrop University.But the two enter their senior seasons united as Gophers, and on Aug. 16 they will return to their hometown with their collegiate team to celebrate their careers and build excitement for the upcoming season.The duo enjoyed tremendous success at Hopkins, where they played to a Minnesota Class AAAA third place finish in 2003. The next year Knight led the Royals to a state title while also winning the Minnesota Associated Press Player of the Year award.Although they received a lot of recognition in high school, the shift to playing Big Ten basketball proved a difficult and trying time. They suddenly found themselves waiting for their turn to contribute on talent-laden squads.“It was definitely hard to come to college and not play,” Knight said. “Since I was Ms. Basketball, I felt like I was letting people down, but in the Big Ten you’re just another fish in the sea.”Knight, a forward, played in only 15 games as a freshman and averaged 2.9 minutes a game. But she learned more about the game from watching All-American center Janel McCarville.“I knew I wasn’t going to play so it became important that I learn from the other players,” Knight said. “Watching Janel and all her different moves, like her no-look passes and post moves, I learned a lot.”Knight knew eventually she would have an opportunity to contribute, and she bided her time in the gym working on her shot to improve her game.“You never know when your time is going to come, so you just have to prepare,” Knight said.Even though she did not see much playing time, her family offered unwavering support through the tough times.“My parents came to every game, home and away, even if I wasn’t playing,” Knight said. “My brothers made me realize how fortunate I am to play in the Big Ten and think about all the priceless moments I get to enjoy.” And last season, when her time came, she ran with the opportunity. She started all 33 games, averaging 8.3 points and 4.5 rebounds per game, in a breakout season that made the pain of not playing subside. The experience left her humble.“I never took for granted each start,” she said. “I couldn’t believe I went from not playing a second in a game to starting.”Jordan Barnes transferred to Minnesota two years ago after spending a semester at Winthrop.“I came in with no expectations; I just wanted an opportunity to play,” Barnes said.Barnes joined the team as a walk-on and slowly made her way from the end of the bench to the court.When senior guard Kelly Roysland suffered an injury last season, Barnes stepped in and started three of the four gamesRoysland missed. She filled in capably, as she averaged 7.3 points per game during that span.“Jordan exemplifies the Gopher mentality with her toughness,” coach Pam Borton said.Last season Barnes played in 32 of the 33 games but only averaged 12.4 minutes a game.“Going back to the ‘U’ has been awesome,” Barnes said. “And it’s been a lot of fun to play with Leslie again.”With her improved play last season, the Gophers expect Barnes to make a bigger contribution this season, along with the consistency Knight provided to help guide them to a successful season.“I think one word stands out for both of them,” Borton said, “and that’s ‘perseverance.’ “last_img read more

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Nelson repeats as NCAA heavyweight champion

first_img—Dane Mizutani contributed to this report. The junior is the fifth heavyweight wrestler to win back-to-back titles for Minnesota. But he’s not satisfied with that.Nelson said his ultimate goal, even before he won the title last season, was to be a three-time champion. He said former Minnesota heavyweights Cole Konrad and Brock Lesnar were his inspiration.“Brock won it once. Cole won it twice,” Nelson said. “I’m right up there with [Konrad], and he’s a guy I always looked up to.”Nelson was the lone Minnesota wrestler to win an individual title, but the Gophers boasted eight All-Americans.Dylan Ness couldn’t build off his Big Ten championship from less than two weeks ago, and the sophomore finished fourth at 149 pounds. Ness shocked the world last season as the NCAA runner-up at 149.Logan Storley had a terrible performance at the Big Ten championships, but the sophomore bounced back to finish fourth at the NCAA meet. He lost in the third-place match to his best friend from high school, Robert Kokesh of Nebraska. Storley was a force all season long, but he seemed to hit a wall in the two postseason tournaments.Sophomore Scott Schiller (197 pounds) finished fifth, sophomore Chris Dardanes (133) finished sixth and both junior David Thorn (125) and senior Cody Yohn (165) finished seventh.Kevin Steinhaus (185), who was upset early in the tournament, did not place.Minnesota’s eight total All-Americans are the most in the nation for the second straight year. Nelson repeats as NCAA heavyweight championMinnesota finished third behind Penn State and Oklahoma State.The Daily Iowan/Rachel JessenIowa Mike Evans (174) wrestles Minnesota’s Logan Storley during the quarterfinals of the NCAA Division I Wrestling Championships on Friday, March 22, 2013 at Wells Fargo Arena in Des Moines, Iowa. Storley won by decision, 3-2. Drew ClaussenMarch 25, 2013Jump to CommentsShare on FacebookShare on TwitterShare via EmailPrintA lot of elite wrestlers have walked the campus for the Gophers wrestling program.Tony Nelson’s name is now definitely on that list.Nelson repeated as the NCAA heavyweight champion over the weekend at the national championships in Des Moines, Iowa.“He wrestled very well,” head assistant coach Brandon Eggum said. “He seemed composed throughout the tournament.”Minnesota finished third as a team behind Penn State and Oklahoma State. The Nittany Lions won their third straight NCAA title.Nelson beat Mike McMullan of Northwestern 6-2 in the finals — the same man he beat less than two weeks ago to capture the Big Ten title.Eggum said McMullan is a very offensive wrestler.“Tony’s defense and counter scoring is so good that if you attack him, you can put yourself in danger,” Eggum said.Nelson said he’s realized all season that he’s had a target on his back. That hasn’t affected the way he wrestles.“They want to be the guy to beat you, [and] to come out and do it again was just a big accomplishment,” the senior said in a press conference after the match.Nelson finished the season with a 33-1 record. He lost his only match to Dom Bradley of Missouri at the Southern Scuffle.last_img read more

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Prologis Buys 106,000 SF Facility; Plans Additional 221,000 SF Spec Building

first_imgPrologis, one of the most prolific buyers of industrial properties in the Valley, purchased the former Plastican plastic injection molding facility for $6.2M.The seller was Phoenix Plastican Properties, LLC of Leominster, Mass.The 106,000 SF property is situated on 21.5 acres and is located at 4101 W. Buckeye Rd. Plans on the excess 15.9 acres call for the construction of 221,00 cross dock industrial building which will be located at the SWC of 43rd Ave. and Buckeye Rd. The speculative building will have 62 dock high doors, 32’ clear height and 82 trailer stalls.Lee & Associates principals Matt Hobaica and Nate Bubeck represented both the buyer and seller in this transaction.“This property offers Prologis an excellent opportunity to build a state-of- the-art building at a time when the Phoenix industrial market is showing strong momentum,”  Hobaica said.The 106,000 SF manufacturing building was constructed in 1993 and is situated on 5 acres with a fenced yard. The building offers rail service, 12 dock high doors and 24’ clear height will be reconditioned and offered for sale or lease.For more information on Prologis, visit their website at www.prologis.com.last_img read more

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Dr. Jonathan Rich Appointed As Lumileds CEO

first_imgAdvertisementClick Here to Read MoreAdvertisementLumileds has announced the appointment of Dr. Jonathan Rich as CEO. Dr. Rich most recently served as chairman and CEO of Berry Global Inc., a Fortune 500 specialty materials and consumer packaging company, from 2010 to 2018. Dr. Rich succeeds Mark Adams, who is stepping down as CEO and from the board of directors but will remain in an advisory role to the company.“I am very pleased to be joining Lumileds and am looking forward to building on the company’s differentiated lighting technology foundation to increase the value we can deliver to customers across a broad set of industries,” said Dr. Rich. “The opportunity for lighting innovation to make a positive impact on safety and sustainability is tremendous.”Before Dr. Rich held the position of chairman and CEO of Berry Global, he was president and CEO at Momentive, a specialty chemical company headquartered in Albany, New York. Prior to that, he held positions with Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., first as president of the Global Chemicals business and subsequently as president of Goodyear’s North American Tire Division. Dr. Rich spent his formative years at General Electric, first as a research scientist at GE Global Research and then in a series of management positions with GE Plastics.AdvertisementHe received a Bachelor of Science degree in chemistry from Iowa State University and a Ph.D. in chemistry from the University of Wisconsin-Madison. He has been a visiting lecturer at Cornell University Johnson School of Business since 2017.“Mark Adams has made significant contributions to Lumileds during his tenure, leading the transition to an independent company and cultivating a culture of innovation and customer focus,” said Rob Seminara, a senior partner at Apollo and chairman of the board of Lumileds. “On behalf of the board of directors of Lumileds, we would like to thank him for his service to the company and wish him the very best in his future endeavors. We are very excited Jon will be joining Lumileds to drive the next phase of innovation and growth and we look forward to working with him again.”Added Adams, “It has been a great experience leading Lumileds’ transition to an independent company that is focused on delivering lighting solutions that truly make a positive impact in the world. I would like to thank the employees of Lumileds and the Apollo team for their support and wish the company much success in the future.”Advertisementlast_img read more

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Linde and SIBUR in ASU deal

first_imgSubscribe Get instant access to must-read content today!To access hundreds of features, subscribe today! At a time when the world is forced to go digital more than ever before just to stay connected, discover the in-depth content our subscribers receive every month by subscribing to gasworld.Don’t just stay connected, stay at the forefront – join gasworld and become a subscriber to access all of our must-read content online from just $270.last_img

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Final Global Tech I Foundations Arrive at ABC-Halbinsel

first_imgWith the final assembly of 60 foundations at WeserWind in Bremerhaven, all of the 80 Global Tech I Tripods have been successfully completed.The welded connections were a big challenge as the conically shaped head and foot braces of the tripods needed to be welded to the cylindrical shaped central tube.Yesterday, the last two foundations were moved to the BLG, and today they have arrived to ABC-Halbinsel for temporary storage. The final assembly of a 900 -ton , 60-meter high giant lasted around four months. All of the 80 foundations will be installed at the Global Tech I wind farm site around the end of this year.[mappress]Offshore WIND staff, December 11, 2013; Image: globaltechonelast_img read more

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